Hum Core, Winter 2006

Study Questions for Beitz’s Political Theory and International Relations

Reading for week 8: pp. 7(b)-9(m), 27(b)-33(t), 35(t)-36(b), 40(m)-42(m), 44(t)-47(b), 50(m)-58(b)*

*(t) - from/to top of page;
(m) - from/to middle of page;
(b) - from/to bottom of page.

(p. 29) Why for Hobbes will it be imprudent to comply with moral rules if one lacks assurance that others will do so as well?

(p. 29) Why for Hobbes can one be assured that others will comply with moral rules if, but only if, a government and police forces exist?

(p. 31) Why might it be hard to leave the state of nature even if everyone will be better off under a common government?

(pp. 32-3) Why might it be harder for states to leave the state of nature than for individuals? (Hint: Are states more likely to be self-interested than individuals?)

(p. 35) Beitz mentions a “predictive” and “prescriptive” use of the state of nature in the international context. What is the difference? (Hint: think of the difference between a thesis about what agents will in fact do, and what agents ought to do, and what it might take to defend each kind of thesis.)

(pp. 35-6) Today’s international scene is a Hobbesian state of nature only if existing societies are perpetually at war. Are they? (For Hobbes’s answer, read the quotation starting on the bottom of p. 31)

(pp. 40-1) Why does the fact that some societies are much more powerful than others mean that the international context is not a Hobbesian state of nature?

(p. 46-7) Why can present day societies expect other societies to cooperate, even in the absence of global government and police forces?

(p. 52) Why according to Beitz is a right of self-preservation more plausible for individuals than for states? (Hint: might a state’s borders be illegally breached—a violation of “territorial integrity”—without injuring anyone? Compare: can a person’s bodily integrity be violated without injury?)

(pp. 53-5) Beitz claims the right of a nation to preserve itself can only be justified by the interests of its individual members. Why does this mean questions of justification should simply ignore the “interests of states”?

(pp. 56-7) Why according to Beitz can’t ethics be based on “enlightened self-interest”?

(p. 58) What is the difference between the point of view of self-interest and “the moral point of view”?