









# *Fall: Thinking*







# BOOK I: *PISTEIS*, OR THE MEANS OF PERSUASION IN PUBLIC ADDRESS

ARISTOTLE

TRANSLATED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY GEORGE A. KENNEDY

▣ Books 1–2 discuss the means of persuasion available to a public speaker from logical argument, the presentation of the speaker’s character, and moving the emotions of the audience. Although this part of rhetoric has come to be known as “invention,” Aristotle himself offers no general term for it until the transition section at the end of book 2, where he refers to it as *dianoia*, “thought.” Throughout books 1 and 2, understanding the available means of persuasion is treated as constituting the whole of rhetoric, properly understood; and until the last sentence of 2.26 there is no anticipation of discussion of style and arrangement in book 3. Books 1–2 are a unit and probably made up the whole of the *Rhetoric* as it once existed.


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
## CHAPTERS I–3: INTRODUCTION

### *Chapter 1: Introduction to Rhetoric for Students of Dialectic*

▣ The *Rhetoric* shows signs of being addressed to different audiences, probably reflecting differing contexts in which Aristotle lectured on rhetoric at different times in his career. Though much of the work provides practical instruction on how to compose a speech, useful to any citizen, some parts seem to be addressed primarily to students of philosophy. What is now regarded as the first chapter of Book 1 was apparently originally addressed to students who had completed a study of dialectic (such as is found in the *Topics*) and who had little knowledge of rhetoric, though they may have been aware of the existence of handbooks on the subject. For them Aristotle explains the similarities between dialectic as they know it and rhetoric as he understands it but does not comment on the differences. The chapter as a whole is very Platonic and contains echoes of several of Plato’s dialogues.

Dialectic, as understood by Aristotle, was the art of philosophical disputation. Practice in it was regularly provided in his philosophical school, and his treatise known as *Topics* is a textbook of dialectic. The opening chapters of the *Topics* may be found in Appendix I.C. The procedure in dialectic was for one student to state a thesis (e.g., “Pleasure is the only good”) and for a second student to try to refute the thesis by asking a series of questions that could be answered by yes or no. If successful, the interlocutor led the respondent into a contradiction or logically undefensible position by means of definition and division of the question or by drawing analogies; however, the respondent might be able to defend his position and win the argument. Dialectic proceeds by question and answer, not, as rhetoric does, by continuous exposition. A dialectical argument does not contain the parts of a public address; there is no introduction, narration, or epilogue, as in a speech—only proof. In dialectic only logical argument is acceptable, whereas in rhetoric (as Aristotle will explain in chapter 2), the impression of character conveyed by the speaker and the emotions awakened in the audience contribute to persuasion.







While both dialectic and rhetoric build their arguments on commonly held opinions (*endoxa*) and deal only with the probable (not with scientific certainty), dialectic examines general issues (such as the nature of justice) whereas rhetoric usually seeks a specific judgment, (e.g., whether or not some specific action was just or whether or not some specific policy will be beneficial). Epideictic is a partial exception to this. Platonic dialogues make extensive use of dialectic as Socrates seeks to refute the position of an opponent—for example Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles in the *Gorgias*. Platonic dialogues also contain rhetorical passages expressive of Socrates' character and appeals to the emotions of the hearer, as in his second speech in the *Phaedrus*.

After discussing the similarities between dialectic and rhetoric, Aristotle criticizes (sections 3–11) the *arts*, or handbooks, of previous writers, which he finds unsatisfactory in several ways. These handbooks are now lost; and the only surviving treatise on rhetoric from the classical period other than Aristotle's is a slightly later work known as the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. Into this discussion are inserted parenthetical remarks (sections 7–9) on the specificity desirable in framing good laws, a subject of interest to students of political philosophy but of limited relevance to rhetorical theory. The chapter concludes (sections 12–14) with a discussion of why rhetoric is useful—remarks that can be thought of as addressed primarily to students of philosophy who, under the influence of Plato, may regard the subject of rhetoric as trivial. A general Greek audience would probably have assumed that rhetoric was useful and been more dubious about dialectic, which could easily seem pedantic hairsplitting, as it did to Isocrates (see, e.g., *Against the Sophists* and the proemion to the *Encomium of Helen*).

Chapter 1 creates acute problems for the unity of the treatise. Aristotle here seems firmly to reject using the emotions, identifies rhetoric with logical argument, and gives no hint that style and arrangement may be important in rhetoric (as will emerge in book 3). In section 6 he even seems to say that the importance and the justice of a case are not appropriate issues for a speaker to discuss; they should be left for the audience to judge. But the justice of a speaker's case, its importance, and its amplification subsequently will be given extended treatment. Some interpreters seek to force the point of view of chapter 1 into conformity with what follows by making very careful distinctions about what Aristotle is saying. This involves claiming, for example, that *pisteis*, “proofs,” in section 3 already includes the use of character and emotion as means of persuasion, that *verbal attack*, *pity*, and *anger* in section 4 refer to *expressions* of emotion rather than to the reasoned use of an understanding of psychology and motivation. Section 6 can be made consistent with later parts of the work if Aristotle is regarded as saying that the speaker's interpretation of what is just or important should not be allowed to color the audience's judgment. It can be stressed that a speaker needs to understand tricks that may be used by an opponent but should not employ them himself. Despite other possible interpretations, it is probably better to acknowledge frankly that chapter 1 is inconsistent with what follows, that it is far more austere in tone than Aristotle's general view of rhetoric, and that the difference results from addressing different audiences and from the attempt to link the study of dialectic with that of rhetoric. Aristotle either failed to revise the chapter or has let stand a deliberately provocative critique of the teaching of rhetoric in his own time as a way of emphasizing the needs for greater attention to logic, thus justifying the writing of a rhetoric handbook by a philosopher. The chapter might even be compared to Socrates' provocative description in the *Gorgias* of contemporary rhetoric as a form of flattery, a view that Socrates, too, subsequently modifies. The result is to encourage a dialogue between the reader and the text of the *Rhetoric* about the moral purpose and valid uses of rhetoric.





The first chapter is one of the earliest examples of an introduction to the study of a discipline (the beginning of the *Topics* is another) and is thus an antecedent of the Greek *prolegomenon* or Latin *accessus* commonly found at the beginning of technical works in later antiquity and the Middle Ages.

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
[1354a] 1. Rhetoric<sup>1</sup> is an *antistrophos*<sup>2</sup> to dialectic; for both are concerned with such things as are, to a certain extent, within the knowledge of all people and belong to no separately defined science.<sup>3</sup> A result is that all people, in some way, share in both; for all, to some extent, try both to test and maintain an argument [as in dialectic] and to defend themselves and attack [others, as in rhetoric]. 2. Now among the general public, some do these things randomly and others through an ability acquired by habit,<sup>4</sup> but since both ways are possible, it is clear that it would also be possible to do the same by [following] a path; for it is possible to observe<sup>5</sup> the cause why some succeed by habit and others accidentally,<sup>6</sup> and all would at once agree that such observation is the activity of an art [*tekhne*].<sup>7</sup>


3. As things are now,<sup>8</sup> those who have composed *Arts of Speech* have worked on a small part of the subject; for only *pisteis*<sup>9</sup> are artistic (other things are supplementary), and these writers say nothing about enthymemes, which is the “body” of persuasion,<sup>10</sup> while they give most of their attention to matters external to the subject; 4. for verbal attack and pity and anger and such emotions of the soul do not relate to fact but are appeals to the juryman.<sup>11</sup> As a result, if all trials were conducted as they are in some present-day states and especially in those well governed, [the handbook writers] would have nothing to say; 5. for everyone thinks the laws ought to require this, and some even adopt the practice and forbid speaking outside the subject, as in the Areopagus too,<sup>12</sup> rightly so providing; for it is wrong to warp the jury by leading them into anger or envy or pity: that is the same as if someone made a straightedge rule crooked before using it. 6. And further, it is clear that the opponents have no function except to show that something is or is not true or has happened or has not happened;<sup>13</sup> whether it is important or trivial or just or unjust, in so far as the lawmaker has not provided a definition, the juryman should somehow decide himself and not learn from the opponents.<sup>14</sup>

▣ The following passage on framing laws resembles some of what Plato says in *Laws* 9.875–76<sup>15</sup> and is apparently a parenthetical remark of Aristotle to students of political philosophy; he may well have said something of this sort to young Alexander. Section 9 will take up where section 6 leaves off.

—G.A.K.

(7. It is highly appropriate for well-enacted laws to define everything as exactly as possible and for as little as possible to be left to the judges:<sup>16</sup> first because it is easier to find one or a few than [to find] many who are prudent and capable of framing laws and judging; [1354b] second, legislation results from consideration over much time, while judgments are made at the moment [of a trial or debate], so it is difficult for the judges to determine justice and benefits fairly; but most important of all, because the judgment of a lawmaker is not about a particular case but about what lies in the future and in general, while the assemblyman and the juryman are actually judging present and specific cases. For them, friendliness and hostility and individual self-interest are often






involved, with the result that they are no longer able to see the truth adequately, but their private pleasure or grief casts a shadow on their judgment. 8. In other matters, then, as we have been saying, the judge should have authority to determine as little as possible; but it is necessary to leave to the judges the question of whether something has happened or has not happened, will or will not be, is or is not the case; for the lawmaker cannot foresee these things.)

9. If this is so, it is clear that matters external to the subject are described as an art by those who define other things: for example, what the introduction [*proimion*] or the narration [*diegēis*]<sup>17</sup> should contain, and each of the other parts; for [in treating these matters] they concern themselves only with how they may put the judge in a certain frame of mind,<sup>18</sup> while they explain nothing about artistic proofs; and that is the question of how one may become *enthymematic*.<sup>19</sup> 10. It is for this reason that although the method of deliberative and judicial speaking is the same and though deliberative subjects are finer and more important to the state than private transactions, [the handbook writers] have nothing to say about the former, and all try to describe the art of speaking in a lawcourt, because it is less serviceable to speak things outside the subject in deliberative situations;<sup>20</sup> for there the judge judges about matters that affect himself, so that nothing is needed except to show that circumstances are as the speaker says.<sup>21</sup> But in judicial speeches this is not enough; rather, it is serviceable to gain over the hearer; for the judgment is about other people's business and the judges, considering the matter in relation to their own affairs and listening with partiality, lend themselves to [the needs of] the litigants but do not judge [objectively]. [1355a] Thus, as we said earlier, in many places the law prohibits speaking outside the subject [in court cases]; in deliberative assemblies the judges themselves adequately guard against this.

11. Since it is evident that artistic method is concerned with *pisteis* and since *pistis* is a sort of demonstration [*apodeixis*]<sup>22</sup> (for we most believe when we suppose something to have been demonstrated) and since rhetorical *apodeixis* is enthymeme (and this is, generally speaking, the strongest of the *pisteis*) and the enthymeme is a sort of syllogism [or reasoning] (and it is a function of dialectic, either as a whole or one of its parts, to see about every syllogism equally), it is clear that he who is best able to see from what materials, and how, a syllogism arises would also be most enthymematic—if he grasps also what sort of things an enthymeme is concerned with and what differences it has from a logical syllogism; for it belongs to the same capacity both to see the true and [to see] what resembles the true, and at the same time humans have a natural disposition for the true and to a large extent hit on the truth: thus an ability to aim at commonly held opinions [*endoxa*] is a characteristic of one who also has a similar ability to regard to the truth.<sup>23</sup>

That other writers describe as an art things outside the subject [of a speech] and that they have rather too much inclined toward judicial oratory is clear; 12. but rhetoric is useful [first] because the true and the just are by nature<sup>24</sup> stronger than their opposites, so that if judgments are not made in the right way [the true and the just] are necessarily defeated [by their opposites]. And this is worthy of censure.<sup>25</sup> Further, even if we were to have the most exact knowledge, it would not be very easy for us in speaking to use it to persuade some audiences. Speech based on knowledge is teaching, but teaching is impossible [with some audiences]; rather, it is necessary for *pisteis* and speeches [as a whole] to be formed on the basis of common [beliefs], as we said in the *Topics*<sup>26</sup> about communication with a crowd. Further, one should be able to argue




persuasively on either side of a question, just as in the use of syllogisms, not that we may actually do both (for one should not persuade what is debased)<sup>27</sup> but in order that it may not escape our notice what the real state of the case is and that we ourselves may be able to refute if another person uses speech unjustly. None of the other arts reasons in opposite directions; dialectic and rhetoric alone do this, for both are equally concerned with opposites.<sup>28</sup> Of course the underlying facts are not equally good in each case; but true and better ones are by nature always more productive of good syllogisms and, in a word, more persuasive. In addition, it would be strange if an inability to defend oneself by means of the body is shameful, while there is no shame in an inability to use speech; [1355a] the latter is more characteristic of humans than is use of the body. 13. And if it is argued that great harm can be done by unjustly using such power of words, this objection applies to all good things except for virtue, and most of all to the most useful things, like strength, health, wealth, and military strategy; for by using these justly one would do the greatest good and unjustly, the greatest harm.<sup>29</sup>

14. That rhetoric, therefore, does not belong to a single defined genus of subject but is like dialectic and that it is useful is clear—and that its function is not to persuade but to see the available means of persuasion in each case, as is true also in all the other arts; for neither is it the function of medicine to create health but to promote this as much as possible; for it is nevertheless possible to treat well those who cannot recover health. In addition, [it is clear] that it is a function of one and the same art to see the persuasive and [to see] the apparently persuasive, just as [it is] in dialectic [to recognize] a syllogism and [to recognize] an apparent syllogism;<sup>30</sup> for sophistry is not a matter of ability but of deliberate choice [*proairesis*] [of specious arguments].<sup>31</sup> In the case of rhetoric, however, there is the difference that one person will be [called] *rhētōr*<sup>32</sup> on the basis of his knowledge and another on the basis of his deliberate choice, while in dialectic *sophist* refers to deliberate choice [of specious arguments], *dialectician* not to deliberate choice, but to ability [at argument generally]. Let us now try to discuss the method itself: how and from what sources we may reach our objectives.<sup>33</sup> Starting again, therefore, as it were from the beginning, after defining what rhetoric is, let us say all that remains [to be said about the whole subject].

## *Chapter 2: Definition of Rhetoric; Pisteis, or the Means of Persuasion in Public Address; Paradigms, Enthymemes, and Their Sources; Common Topics; Eidē and Idia*

1. Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion.<sup>34</sup> This is the function of no other art;<sup>35</sup> for each of the others<sup>36</sup> is instructive and persuasive about its own subject: for example, medicine about health and disease and geometry about the properties of magnitudes and arithmetic about numbers and similarly in the case of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric seems to be able to observe the persuasive about “the given,” so to speak. That, too, is why we say it does not include technical knowledge of any particular, defined genus [of subjects].

2. Of the *pisteis*, some are atechnic [“nonartistic”], some entechnic [“embodied in art, artistic”].<sup>37</sup> I call atechnic those that are not provided by “us” [i.e., the potential speaker] but are



preexisting; for example, witnesses, testimony of slaves taken under torture,<sup>38</sup> contracts, and such like; and artistic whatever can be prepared by method and by “us”; thus, one must *use* the former and *invent*<sup>39</sup> the latter. [1356a] 3. Of the *pisteis* provided through speech there are three species; for some are in the character [*ēthos*] of the speaker, and some in disposing the listener in some way, and some in the argument [*logos*] itself, by showing or seeming to show something.<sup>40</sup>


4. [There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken<sup>41</sup> in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt.<sup>42</sup> And this should result from the speech, not from a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person;<sup>43</sup> for it is not the case, as some of the technical writers propose in their treatment of the art, that fair-mindedness [*epieikeia*] on the part of the speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness;<sup>44</sup> rather, character is almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuasion.

5. [There is persuasion] through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion [*pathos*] by the speech; for we do not give the same judgment when grieved and rejoicing or when being friendly and hostile. To this and only this we said contemporary technical writers try to give their attention. The details on this subject will be made clear when we speak about the emotions.<sup>45</sup>


6. Persuasion occurs through the arguments [*logoi*] when we show the truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case.

7. Since *pisteis* come about through these [three means], it is clear that to grasp an understanding of them is the function of one who can form syllogisms and be observant about characters and virtues and, third, about emotions (what each of the emotions is and what are its qualities and from what it comes to be and how). The result is that rhetoric is a certain kind of offshoot [*paraphues*] of dialectic and of ethical studies (which it is just to call politics).<sup>46</sup> (Thus, too, rhetoric dresses itself up<sup>47</sup> in the form of politics, as do those who pretend to a knowledge of it,<sup>48</sup> sometimes through lack of education, sometimes through boastfulness and other human causes.) Rhetoric is partly [*morion ti*] dialectic, and resembles it, as we said at the outset; for neither of them is identifiable with knowledge of any specific subject, but they are distinct abilities of supplying words. Concerning their potentiality and how they relate to each other, almost enough has been said.

8. In the case of persuasion through proving or seeming to prove something, just as in dialectic [1356b] there is on the one hand induction [*epagōgē*] and on the other the syllogism and the apparent syllogism, so the situation is similar in rhetoric; for the *paradeigma* [“example”] is an induction, the *enthymēma* a syllogism. I call a rhetorical syllogism an enthymeme, a rhetorical induction a paradigm.<sup>49</sup> And all [speakers] produce logical persuasion by means of paradigms or enthymemes and by nothing other than these. As a result, since it is always necessary to show something either by syllogizing or by inducing (and this is clear to us from the *Analytics*),<sup>50</sup> it is necessary that each of these be the same as each of the others.<sup>51</sup> 9. What the difference is between a paradigm and an enthymeme is clear from the *Topics* (for an account was given there earlier of syllogism and induction):<sup>52</sup> to show on the basis of many similar instances that something is so is in dialectic induction, in rhetoric paradigm; but to show that if some premises are true,









something else [the conclusion] beyond them results from these because they are true, either universally or for the most part, in dialectic is called syllogism and in rhetoric enthymeme. 10. And it is also apparent that either species of rhetoric<sup>53</sup> has merit (what has also been said in the *Methodics*<sup>54</sup> is true in these cases too); for some rhetorical utterances are paradigmatic, some enthymematic; and similarly, some orators are paradigmatic, some enthymematic. Speeches using paradigms are not less persuasive, but those with enthymemes excite more favorable audience reaction. 11. The cause—and how each should be used—we shall explain later;<sup>55</sup> now we shall explain these things themselves more clearly.

Since the persuasive is persuasive to someone (and is either immediately plausible and believable in itself or seems to be shown by statements that are so) and since no art examines the particular—for example, the art of medicine does not specify what is healthful for Socrates or for Callias but for persons of a certain sort (this is artistic, while particulars are limitless and not knowable)—neither does rhetoric theorize about each opinion—what may seem so to Socrates or Hippias—but about what seems true to people of a certain sort, as is also true with dialectic.<sup>56</sup> For the latter does not form syllogisms from things at random (some things seem true even to madmen) but from that [which seems true] to people in need of argument, and rhetoric [forms enthymemes] from things [that seem true] to people already accustomed to deliberate among themselves.<sup>57</sup> [1357a] 12. Its function [*ergon*] is concerned with the sort of things we debate and for which we do not have [other] arts and among such listeners as are not able to see many things all together or to reason from a distant starting point. And we debate about things that seem to be capable of admitting two possibilities; for no one debates things incapable of being different either in past or future or present, at least not if they suppose that to be the case; for there is nothing more [to say]. 13. It is possible to form syllogisms and draw inductive conclusions either from previous syllogisms or from statements that are not reasoned out but require a syllogism [if they are to be accepted] because they are not commonly believed [*endoxa*]; but the former of these [i.e., a chain of syllogisms] is necessarily not easy to follow because of the length [of the argument] (the judge is assumed to be a simple person),<sup>58</sup> and the latter is not persuasive because the premises are not agreed to or commonly believed. Thus, it is necessary for an enthymeme and a paradigm to be concerned with things that are for the most part capable of being other than they are—the paradigm inductively, the enthymeme syllogistically—and drawn from few premises and often less than those of the primary syllogism;<sup>59</sup> for if one of these is known, it does not have to be stated, since the hearer supplies it: for example, [to show] that Dorieus has won a contest with a crown it is enough to have said that he has won the Olympic games, and there is no need to add that the Olympic games have a crown as the prize; for everybody knows that.<sup>60</sup>

14. Since few of the premises from which rhetorical syllogisms are formed are necessarily true (most of the matters with which judgment and examination are concerned can be other than they are; for people deliberate and examine what they are doing, and [human] actions are all of this kind, and none of them [are], so to speak, necessary) and since things that happen for the most part and are possible can only be reasoned on the basis of other such things, and necessary actions [only] from necessities (and this is clear to us also from the *Analytics*),<sup>61</sup> it is evident that [the premises] from which enthymemes are spoken are sometimes necessarily true







but mostly true [only] for the most part. Moreover, enthymemes are derived from probabilities [*eikota*] and signs [*sēmeia*], so it is necessary that each of these be the same as each [of the truth values mentioned];<sup>62</sup> 15. for a probability [*eikos*] is what happens for the most part, not in a simple sense, as some define it, but whatever, among things that can be other than they are, is so related to that in regard to which it is probable as a universal is related to a particular.<sup>63</sup> [1357b] 16. In the case of signs [*sēmeia*], some are related as the particular to the universal, some as the universal to the particular. Of these, a necessary sign is a *tekmērion*, and that which is not necessary has no distinguishing name. 17. Now I call necessary those from which a [logically valid] syllogism can be formed; thus, I call this kind of sign a *tekmērion*; for when people think it is not possible to refute a statement, they think they are offering a *tekmērion*, as though the matter were shown and concluded [*peparasmēnon*]. (*Tekmar* and *peras* [“limit, conclusion”] have the same meaning in the ancient form of [our] language.) 18. An example of signs [*sēmeia*] related as the particular to the universal is if someone were to state that since Socrates was wise and just, it is a sign that the wise are just. This is indeed a sign, but refutable, even if true in this case; for it is not syllogistically valid. But if someone were to state that there is a sign that someone is sick, for he has a fever, or that a woman has given birth, for she has milk, that is a necessary sign. Among signs, this is only true of a *tekmērion*; for only it, if true, is irrefutable. It is an example of the relation of the universal to the particular if someone said that it is a sign of fever that someone breathes rapidly. This, too, is refutable, even if true [in some case]; for it is possible to breathe rapidly and not be feverish. Thus, what probability is and what sign and *tekmērion* are and how they differ has now been explained. In the *Analytics*<sup>64</sup> they are defined more clearly, and the cause explained why some are not syllogistic and others are.

19. It has been explained that a paradigm is an induction and with what kinds of things it is concerned. It is reasoning neither from part to whole nor from whole to part but from part to part, like to like, when two things fall under the same genus but one is better known than the other.<sup>65</sup> For example, [when someone claims] that Dionysius is plotting tyranny because he is seeking a bodyguard; for Peisistratus also, when plotting earlier, sought a guard and after receiving it made himself tyrant, and Theagenes [did the same] in Megara, and others, whom the audience knows of, all become examples of Dionysius, of whom they do not yet know whether he makes his demand for this reason. All these actions fall under the same [genus]: that one plotting tyranny seeks a guard.<sup>66</sup>

[1358a] The sources of *pisteis* that seem demonstrative [*apodeiktikai*] have now been explained. 20. But in the case of enthymemes, a very big difference—and one overlooked by almost everybody—is one that is also found in the case of syllogisms in dialectical method; for some [enthymemes] are formed in accord with the method of rhetoric, just as also some syllogisms are formed in accord with the method of dialectic, while others accord with [the content of] other arts and capabilities, either those in existence or those not yet understood.<sup>67</sup> Hence, [the differences] escape notice of the listeners; and the more [speakers] fasten upon [the subject matter] in its proper sense, [the more] they depart from rhetoric or dialectic.<sup>68</sup> This statement will be clearer if explained in more detail.





### *The “Topics” of Syllogisms and Enthymemes*

▣ *Topos* literally means “place,” metaphorically that location or space in an art where a speaker can look for “available means of persuasion.” Rhetoric itself can be said to operate in civic space. Although the word accords with Aristotle’s fondness for visual imagery, he did not originate its use in the sense of “topic”; Isocrates, early in the fourth century, had so used it, and probably others did before him. In Isocrates’ *Encomium of Helen* (section 4) *topos* refers to forms of eristical argument, such as fact or possibility—what Aristotle will call *koīna*. In the same speech (section 38) *topos* refers to the use of an ancient witness, Theseus’ opinion of Helen—what Aristotle regards as “nonartistic” *pistis*. The word may also already have been used in mnemonic theory of the physical setting against which an object or idea could be remembered. Neither in *Topics* nor in *Rhetoric* does Aristotle give a definition of *topos*, another sign that he assumed the word would be easily understood; he does, however, give his own special twist to its meaning, usually distinguishing it from *koīna* and *idia* and using it primarily of strategies of argument as discussed in 2.23. See Sprute 1982, 172–82.


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21. I am saying that dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are those in which we state *topoi*, and these are applicable in common [*koinēi*] to questions of justice and physics and politics and many different species [of knowledge]; for example, the *topos* of the more and the less;<sup>69</sup> for to form syllogisms or speak enthymemes from this about justice will be just as possible as about physics or anything else, although these subjects differ in species.<sup>70</sup> But there are “specifics”<sup>71</sup> that come from the premises of each species and genus [of knowledge]; for example, in physics there are premises from which there is neither an enthymeme nor a syllogism applicable to ethics; and in ethics [there are] others not useful in physics. It is the same in all cases. The former [the common *topoi*] will not make one understand any genus; for they are not concerned with any underlying subject. As to the latter [the specifics], to the degree that someone makes better choice of the premises, he will have created knowledge different from dialectic and rhetoric without its being recognized; for if he succeeds in hitting on first principles [*arkhai*], the knowledge will no longer be dialectic or rhetoric but the science of which [the speaker] grasps the first principles.<sup>72</sup>

22. Most enthymemes are derived from these species that are particular and specific, fewer from the common [topics].<sup>73</sup> Just as in the case of *topoi*, so also in the case of enthymemes, a distinction should be made between the species and the *topoi* from which they are to be taken. By “species” I mean the premises specific to each genus [of knowledge], and by *topoi* those common to all. But let us take up first the genera [*genē*] of rhetoric so that having defined how many there are, we may separately take up their elements<sup>74</sup> and premises.<sup>75</sup>

### *Chapter 3: The Three Species of Rhetoric: Deliberative, Judicial, and Epideictic*


1. The species [*eidē*] of rhetoric are three in number; for such is the number [of classes] to which the hearers of speeches belong. A speech [situation] consists of three things: a speaker and a subject on which he speaks and someone addressed,<sup>76</sup> [1358b] and the objective [*telos*]



of the speech relates to the last (I mean the hearer). 2. Now it is necessary for the hearer to be either a spectator [*theoros*] or a judge [*kritēs*], and [in the latter case] a judge of either past or future happenings. A member of a democratic assembly is an example of one judging about future happenings, a juryman an example of one judging the past. A spectator is concerned with the ability [of the speaker].<sup>77</sup> 3. Thus, there would necessarily be three genera of rhetorics;<sup>78</sup> *symboleutikon* ["deliberative"], *dikanikon* ["judicial"], *epideiktikon* ["demonstrative"]. Deliberative advice is either protreptic ["exhortation"] or apotreptic ["dissuasion"]; for both those advising in private and those speaking in public always do one or the other of these. In the law court there is either accusation [*katēgoria*] or defense [*apologia*]; for it is necessary for the disputants to offer one or the other of these. In epideictic, there is either praise [*epainos*] or blame [*psogos*]. 4. Each of these has its own "time": for the deliberative speaker, the future (for whether exhorting or dissuading he advises about future events); for the speaker in court, the past (for he always prosecutes or defends concerning what has been done); in epideictic the present is the most important; for all speakers praise or blame in regard to existing qualities, but they often also make use of other things, both reminding [the audience] of the past and projecting the course of the future.<sup>79</sup> 5. The "end"<sup>80</sup> of each of these is different, and there are three ends for three [species]: for the deliberative speaker [the end] is the advantageous [*sympheron*]<sup>81</sup> and the harmful (for someone urging something advises it as the better course and one dissuading dissuades on the ground that it is worse), and he includes other factors as incidental: whether it is just or unjust, or honorable or disgraceful; for those speaking in the law courts [the end] is the just [*dikaion*] and the unjust, and they make other considerations incidental to these; for those praising and blaming [the end] is the honorable [*kalon*] and the shameful, and these speakers bring up other considerations in reference to these qualities. 6. Here is a sign that the end of each [species of rhetoric] is what has been said: sometimes one would not dispute other factors: for example, a judicial speaker [might not deny] that he has done something or done harm, but he would never agree that he has [intentionally] done wrong; for [if he admitted that,] there would be no need of a trial. Similarly, deliberative speakers often grant other factors, but they would never admit that they are advising things that are not advantageous [to the audience] or that they are dissuading [the audience] from what is beneficial; and often they do not insist that it is not unjust to enslave neighbors or those who have done no wrong. And similarly, those who praise or blame do not consider whether someone has done actions that are advantageous or harmful [to himself] [1359a] but often they include it even as a source of praise that he did what was honorable without regard to the cost to himself; for example, they praise Achilles because he went to the aid of his companion Patroclus knowing that he himself must die, though he could have lived. To him, such a death was more honorable; but life was advantageous.

### *Propositions Common to All Species of Rhetoric*

No technical term appears in this chapter to denote the four subjects of propositions described here, but in 2.18.2 they are called *koina*, "common things," "commonalties," in contrast to *idia*, "specifics." They are discussed in greater detail in 2.19. Since the *koinon* "greater and smaller" discussed in section




9 seems similar to the topic of “the more and the less” mentioned in 1.2.21, these *koina* have often been called “topics” or “common topics.” Grimaldi (1980–88, 1:85–86) objects to this, with some reason, though in 3.19.2 Aristotle speaks of “topics” of amplification and seems to be referring to 2.19. Generally, however, Aristotle keeps them distinct: the topic of “the more and the less,” discussed separately in 2.23.4, is a strategy of argument, always involving some contrast, whereas “greater and smaller,” discussed in 1.7, 14 and 2.19.26–27, are arguments about the degree of *magnitude* (that term occurs in 2.18.4) or importance of something and are analogous to such questions as whether something is possible or has actually been done. Whether something is possible, actually true, or important are fundamental issues in any speech; and thus Aristotle mentions them immediately after identifying the basic issues of the advantageous, the just, and the honorable.


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7. It is evident from what has been said that it is first of all necessary [for a speaker] to have propositions [*protaseis*] on these matters.<sup>82</sup> (*Tekmēria* and probabilities and signs are rhetorical propositions. A syllogism is wholly from propositions, and the enthymeme is a syllogism consisting of propositions expressed.)<sup>83</sup> 8. And since impossibilities cannot be done nor have been done, but possibilities [alone can be done or have been done], it is necessary for the deliberative, judicial, and epideictic speaker to have propositions about the possible and the impossible and [about] whether something has happened or not and [about] whether it will or will not come to be. 9. Further, since all speakers, praising and blaming and urging and dissuading and prosecuting and defending, not only try to show what has been mentioned but that the good or the evil or the honorable or the shameful or the just or the unjust is great or small, either speaking of things in themselves or in comparison to each other, it is clear that it would be necessary also to have propositions about the great and the small and the greater and the lesser, both generally and specifically; for example, [about] what is the greater or lesser good or injustice or justice, and similarly about other qualities.<sup>84</sup> The subjects about which it is necessary to frame propositions have [now] been stated. Next we must distinguish between each in specific terms; that is, what deliberation, and what epideictic speeches, and, thirdly, what lawsuits, are concerned with.

## NOTES


1. *Hē rhētorikē* (the rhetorical), a feminine singular adjective used as an abstract noun; cf. *dialektikē*, *poiētikē*. Neither dialectic nor rhetoric assume knowledge of any technical subject, and both build a case on the basis of what any reasonable person would believe. Aristotle takes the term *rhetoric* from Plato; others usually spoke of the “art of speech”; see Schiappa 1990.
2. *Antistrophos* is commonly translated “counterpart.” Other possibilities include “correlative” and “coordinate.” The word can mean “converse.” In Greek choral lyric, the metrical pattern of a *strophē*, or stanza, is repeated with different words in the *antistrophē*. Aristotle is, however, probably thinking of, and rejecting, the analogy of the true and false arts elaborated by Socrates in the *Gorgias*, where justice is said to






be an *antistrophos* to medicine (464b8) and rhetoric, the false form of justice, is compared to cookery, the false form of medicine (465c1–3). Isocrates (*Antidosis* 182) speaks of the arts of the soul (called philosophy, but essentially political rhetoric) and the arts of the body (gymnastic) as *antistrophoi*. This view is equally unacceptable to Aristotle, for whom rhetoric is a tool, like dialectic, though its subject matter is derived from some other discipline, such as ethics or politics: see *Rhetoric* 1.2.7. Aristotle thus avoids the fallacy of Plato's *Gorgias* where Socrates is obsessed with finding some kind of knowledge specific to rhetoric. On later interpretations of *antistrophos* see Green 1990.

3. The first sentence of the treatise, with its proposition and supporting reason, is an example of what Aristotle will call an enthymeme. The reader should become sensitive to the constant use of enthymemes throughout the text, often introduced by the particle *gar* (for).
4. The former hardly know what they are doing; but the latter, by trial and error, have gained a practical sense of what is effective.
5. *Theorein*, lit. “see” but with the implication “theorize.” This is an instance of the visual imagery common in the *Rhetoric*.
6. Here, as often, Aristotle reverses the order of reference: *accidentally* refers back to *randomly*. Such *chiasmus* is a common feature of Greek.
7. In contrast to Socrates in the *Gorgias*, Aristotle has no doubt that rhetoric is an art. Awareness of the cause of success allows technique to be conceptualized and taught systematically. On Aristotle's understanding of an “art,” see the passage from *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.4 in Appendix 1.B.
8. In 1.2.4 Aristotle again criticizes contemporary technical writers. He thus appears to be thinking primarily of the handbooks of the mid-fourth century, such as those by Pamphilus and Callippus cited in 2.23.21. Aristotle collected the doctrines of some handbooks in a lost work, *Synagōgē tekhnōn*; see Appendix 1.D. Plato provides a brief summary of the earlier ones in *Phaedrus* 266d–67d.
9. *Pistis* (pl. *pisteis*) has a number of different meanings in different contexts: “proof, means of persuasion, belief,” etc. In 1.2.2–3 Aristotle distinguishes between artistic and nonartistic *pisteis*, and divides the former into three means of persuasion based on character, logical argument, and arousing emotion. Here in chap. 1 readers familiar with dialectic have no knowledge yet of persuasion by character or emotion and will assume that *pistis* means “logical proof.” In 3.17.15 *pistis* means “logical argument” in contrast to character presentation.
10. *Body* is here contrasted with “matters external” in the next clause. Though Aristotle does not say so, one might speculate that the soul, or life, of persuasion comes from ethical and emotional qualities.
11. The handbooks offered examples of argument from probability, but they did not recognize its logical structure. The concept of the logical syllogism and its rhetorical counterpart, the enthymeme (to be discussed in chap. 2), are Aristotelian contributions. The handbooks probably treated the emotions in discussing the proemium and epilogue (on which see Aristotle's account in 3.13.19) and in separate collections or discussions such as the *Eleoi* of Thrasymachus (see *Rhetoric* 3.1.7).




12. In Aristotle's time the jurisdiction of the Athenian court of the Areopagus was chiefly limited to homicide cases. That its rules of relevance were strict is also attested in Lycurgus' speech *Against Leocrates* 12.
13. On the possible implications of this statement for Aristotle's view of a "general rhetoric," see Wieland 1968; but there is no other passage in Aristotle expressly supporting the view Wieland advances.
14. On the problems created by this statement, see the introductory comment to this chapter.
15. A suggestion made to the translator by Eckhardt Schütrumpf.
16. This "philosophical" position is somewhat modified in 1.13.13, when Aristotle considers the practical problems involved.
17. The *Arts*, or handbooks of rhetoric, were organized around discussion of what should be said in each of the separate parts usually found in a judicial speech. These included *prooimion* (introduction), *diēgēsis* (narration), *pistis* (proof), and *epilogos* (conclusion) and sometimes additional parts. See 3.13–19.
18. This was regarded as a major function of the prooemium (cf. 3.14.9–11) and epilogue (3.19.1).
19. The meaning of this term will be explained in the next paragraph.
20. The *Arts* of rhetoric to which Aristotle refers were certainly largely concerned with techniques useful in the law courts; but speeches like Demosthenes' *On the Crown* show that these could be as fine and as politically significant as speeches in the democratic assembly and were by no means limited to "private transactions," or contracts, as Aristotle insinuates. In the manuscripts the sentence continues, "and deliberative oratory is less mischievous than judicial, but of more general interest." This is probably an addition by a later writer.
21. In deliberative rhetoric the "judges" are members of a council or assembly making decisions about public matters that affect themselves.
22. *Apodeixis* = "demonstration," usu. with logical validity (as in scientific reasoning) but occasionally more generally, including probable argument (as here).
23. On *endoxa* see *Topics* 1.1 in Appendix I.C. The student is assumed already to understand, from earlier study of logic and dialectic, the concepts of *pistis*, *apodeixis*, and *enthymēma*. Enthymeme literally means "something in the mind" and had been used by Alcidas and Isocrates to mean an "idea" expressed in a speech. In *Prior Analytics* 2.27 an enthymeme is defined as "a syllogism from probabilities or signs." Aristotle sometimes uses *syllogismos* loosely to mean "reasoning," *enthymēma* to mean a consideration in whatever form it is put. A valid syllogism in the technical sense is a logical certainty, "true," and most perfectly seen only when expressed symbolically, e.g., "If all A is B, and some A is C, then all C is B." The traditional example in post-Aristotelian logic is, "If all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal." In 1.2.14 Aristotle says that "few" of the premises of enthymemes are necessarily true, thus slightly modifying the definition in the *Analytics*. In 1.2.13 and 2.22.3 he says that an enthymeme need not express all its premises. The Aristotelian distinction between a syllogism and an enthymeme thus seems largely one of context—tightly reasoned philosophical discourse in the case of the syllogism versus popular speech or writing with resulting




informality in the expression of the argument in an enthymeme. In public address an argument may be a worthwhile consideration even if it is not absolutely valid. An example of a typical enthymeme might be “Socrates is virtuous; for he is wise” or “Since/If Socrates is wise, he is virtuous.” Here the premises are only probable and a universal major premise, “All the wise are virtuous” is assumed. For Aristotle’s own examples of enthymemes, see 2.21.2 and the end of 3.17.17.

24. Aristotle believed that truth was grounded in nature (*physis*) and capable of apprehension by reason. In this he differs both from Plato (for whom truth is grounded in the divine origin of the soul) and from the sophists (for whom judgments were based on *nomos* [convention], which in turn results from the ambivalent nature of language as the basis of human society).
25. On the text and interpretation of this sentence, see Grimaldi, 1980–88, 1:25–28. Judgments will not be made in the right way if the facts and reasons are not brought out persuasively. To do this, the speaker needs a knowledge of rhetoric.
26. *Topics* 1.1.2; see Appendix I.C.
27. *What is debased* (*ta phaula*) refers to whatever is bad, cheap, or morally and socially useless. This principle, important as a response to the criticisms of Plato, appears only in a parenthetical remark and is not repeated in the prescriptive parts of the treatise.
28. There is, however, the difference that in dialectic, opposite trains of argument are actually expressed in the dialectical situation, whereas in rhetoric the speaker has usually tried to think out the opposing arguments before speaking to be able to answer them if need arises. But occasionally, an orator will both express and refute an opposing argument in the course of a speech or even be seen debating with himself about what is right.
29. Another possible echo of instruction to Alexander.
30. Rhetoric uses both logically valid arguments and probabilities. The jump to sophistry in the next sentence perhaps implies a recognition that “the apparently persuasive” and “an apparent syllogism” include fallacious arguments that initially sound valid in an oral situation but will not hold up under scrutiny. Both the orator and the dialectician need to be able to recognize these.
31. In modern linguistic terminology, *sophist* is the “marked” member of the pair *dialectician/sophist* in that the first includes the second; but *rhētōr* is “unmarked” and may be interpreted either as any effective speaker or as a speaker who uses tricky arguments.
32. In classical Greek, *rhētōr* means any public speaker, though often referring to a person who plays a leadership role in public debate or is active in the law courts. In the Roman period, *rhētōr* frequently means rhetorician, “teacher of rhetoric.” Latin *orator* (orig. “envoy”) and thus English “orator” are translations of *rhētōr* but take on an implication of eloquence not necessarily present in the Greek word.
33. For some speculations on Aristotle’s objectives, see Lord 1981. Aristotle’s own objective is clearly an understanding of the nature, materials, and uses of rhetoric; but he has pointed out that the art is useful, and as the treatise unrolls it will often take on the tone of a prescriptive handbook on how to compose a persuasive speech.
34. Aristotle uses the phrase *estō dē*, “Let X be . . .” commonly of a working hypothesis rather than a final definition and occasionally to resume a definition made earlier. The defi-









nition here is anticipated in 1.1.14 on the *ergon* of rhetoric. He identifies the genus to which rhetoric belongs as *dynamis*: “ability, capacity, faculty.” In his philosophical writing *dynamis* is the regular word for “potentiality” in matter or form that is “actualized” by an efficient cause. The actuality produced by the potentiality of rhetoric is not the written or oral text of a speech, or even persuasion but the art of “seeing” how persuasion may be effected. In *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.4 (see Appendix 1.B) he defines all art as a reasoned capacity to make something and says that it is concerned with the coming-into-being of something that is capable of either being or not being. Art is thus for him not the product of artistic skill, but the skill itself. Later rhetoricians often amplify Aristotle’s definition by adding *through speech*; the root of the word *rhetoric*, *rhē-*, refers specifically to speech. Though he uses *poetics* to refer to arts other than poetry (dance, painting, sculpture), he never uses *rhetoric* to refer to any art except that of speech. As is clear from chap. 3, Aristotle primarily thinks of rhetoric as manifested in the civic context of public address; but he often draws examples of rhetoric from poetry or historical writing, and in the *Poetics* (19.1456a–b) the “thought” of a speaker in tragedy is said to be a matter of rhetoric. *In each case* (*peri hekaston*) refers to the fact that rhetoric deals with specific circumstances (particular individuals and their actions). *To see* translates *theorēsai*, “to be an observer of and to grasp the meaning or utility of.” English *theory* comes from the related noun *theoria*. *The available means of persuasion* renders *to endekhomenon pithanon*, “what is inherently and potentially persuasive” in the facts, circumstances, character of the speaker, attitude of the audience, etc. *Endekhomenon* often means “possible.”

35. Dialectic comes closest but deals with general questions, not specific cases; and for dialectic the final term, *means of persuasion* (*pithanon*), would presumably become *means of reasoning* (*sylogismos*); see *Topics* 1.1 in Appendix 1.C.
36. Except, of course, dialectic.
37. Later writers sometimes call these *extrinsic* and *intrinsic*, respectively. Aristotle discusses atechnic proof in 1.15. In 3.16.1 he also refers to the “facts” in an epideictic speech as atechnic.
38. In Greek law, the evidence of slaves was only admissible in court if taken under torture. There was much debate about its reliability; see 1.15.26.
39. *Heurein*, “to find out”; *heuresis* becomes the regular word for rhetorical invention.
40. *Ethos* in Aristotle means “character,” esp. “moral character,” and except in 2.21.16 is regarded as an attribute of a person, not of a speech. Aristotle does not use the term in the technical sense of “rhetorical ethos,” the technique or effect of the presentation of character in a discourse. “Disposing the listener in some way” is defined in sec. 5 below as leading the hearers to feel emotion (*pathos*). Again, *pathos* is an attribute of persons, not of a speech. The shorthand ethos-pathos-logos to describe the modes of persuasion is a convenience but does not represent Aristotle’s own usage.
41. Aristotle is not thinking of style and delivery but of the thought and contents.
42. Here and in 1.9.1 and 2.1.5–7 the role of character in a speech is regarded as making the speaker seem trustworthy. The extended discussion of types of character in 2.12–17 relates to the somewhat different matter of the adaptation of the character of a speaker to the character of an audience. Aristotle’s later treatment of character in rhetoric is in fact somewhat wider than in this initial definition.




43. Aristotle thus does not include in rhetorical ethos the authority that a speaker may possess due to his position in government or society, previous actions, reputation for wisdom, or anything except what is actually contained in the speech and the character it reveals. Presumably, he would regard all other factors, sometimes highly important in the success of rhetoric, as inartistic; but he never says so. One practical reason for stressing character as revealed within the speech was that Greek law required defendants to speak on their own behalf, and they were often lacking in external authority. They could commission a speech from a professional speech-writer (logographer) and then memorize it for delivery in court. Lysias, in particular, had great success in conveying a favorable impression or moral character (*ethopoia*) in the many speeches he wrote for defendants.
44. Some handbook writers perhaps rejected an appearance of fair-mindedness as too mild and favored an uncompromising attitude. Aristotle's point is that an appearance of fair-mindedness gives the speaker an initial advantage.
45. In 2.2–11, Aristotle's inclusion of emotion as a mode of persuasion, despite his objections to the handbooks, is a recognition that among human beings judgment is not entirely a rational act. There are morally valid emotions in every situation, and it is part of the orator's duty to clarify these in the minds of the audience. On this question in general, see Johnstone 1980; 1–24.
46. In calling rhetoric an *antistrophos* of dialectic in 1.1.1. and an offshoot of dialectic and ethical studies here, and “partly dialectic” and like it in the next sentence, Aristotle avoids use of the formal categories of genus and species. He cannot very well call rhetoric a species of dialectic, since it contains elements—the persuasive effect of character and emotion in particular—that are not proper to dialectic; but at the same time he stresses the logical side of rhetoric and thus its relationship to dialectic. He does not entertain the possibility that dialectic should be regarded as a species of rhetoric, perhaps because dialectic deals with universals, rhetoric with specifics; dialectic is logically prior. Also, to make rhetoric the more general term would lead to the celebration of it as the most characteristic and worthwhile human activity, as Isocrates regarded it. For Aristotle, that honor belongs to philosophy—hence his attempt to find metaphors to describe rhetoric as a mixture of logical, political, and ethical elements. In *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.2.4–6 he says that politics is an “architectonic” subject, of which generalship, economics, and rhetoric are parts.
47. *Hypoduetai*, an echo of Plato, *Gorgias* 464c.
48. Gorgias, Polus, Isocrates, and their followers.
49. Aristotle will discuss the paradigm at greater length in 2.20 and the enthymeme in 2.22. The first three sentences of this paragraph, found in all manuscripts, are double-bracketed by Rudolf Kassel in his Berlin 1976 edition of the Greek text, which is Kassel's way of indicating passages that he regarded as later additions by Aristotle to the otherwise completed treatise. These are interesting suggestions, but essentially subjective in each case.
50. *Prior Analytics* 2.23; *Posterior Analytics* 1.1.
51. Not identical, in which case there would be no need for two sets of terms, but *essentially* the same in their underlying structure. In formal logic an induction consists of a series of particular observations from which a general conclusion is drawn; in rhetoric it takes the form of a particular statement supported by one or more parallels, with the


- universal conclusion left unstated. Similarly, an enthymeme rarely takes the full syllogistic form of major premise, minor premise, and conclusion; more often a conclusion is offered and supported by a reason, as in the first sentence of the *Rhetoric*. On the logic of this passage see Schröder 1985. Schröder does not agree with Kassel's view that it is a later addition.
52. There is some discussion of syllogism in *Topics* 1.1, and 1.12 offers a definition of induction with an example: "If the skilled pilot is best, and [similarly] the charioteer, then in general the skilled is the best in each thing."
  53. The species using example or that using enthymeme.
  54. A lost logical work by Aristotle of which the extant *On Interpretation* may have been a part; see Rist 1989, 84.
  55. In 2.20–24.
  56. Dialectic builds its proof on the opinions of all, the majority, or the wise; cf. *Topics* 1.1 in Appendix 1.C.
  57. Translating the text as conjectured by Kassel.
  58. By *judge* (*kritēs*) Aristotle means a member of the assembly or of a jury. In Athenian legal procedure there were no professional judges in the modern sense. The democratic juries of the Athenian courts ranged in size from 201 to 5,001, drawn by lot from the male citizen body.
  59. The fully expressed syllogism that is logically inherent in the enthymeme.
  60. Later writers (see Appendix I.F) often regard an enthymeme as an abbreviated syllogism in which one premise, usually the major, is not expressed but is assumed, e.g., "Socrates is mortal, for he is a man," assuming "all men are mortal." Aristotle notes that this is often the case, but it is not a necessary feature of the enthymeme. The real determinant of an enthymeme in contrast to a syllogism is what a popular audience will understand. Aristotle regards rhetoric, and thus the enthymeme, as addressed to an audience that cannot be assumed to follow intricate logical argument or will be impatient with premises that seem unnecessary steps in the argument. The underlying logical structure should, however be present.
  61. *Prior Analytics* 1.8, 1.12–14, 1.27; *Posterior Analytics* 1.6, 1.30, 2.12.
  62. I.e., probabilities correspond to things true for the most part, signs to things necessarily true. But Aristotle will modify this in what follows: some signs are necessary, others only probable. Both probabilities and signs are statements about human actions, though they may be based on physical manifestations, as the following examples show.
  63. Grimaldi (1980–88, 1:62) instances "Children love their parents": it is a "probability" because a general observation—universal in form, probably, but not necessarily true in particular instances. "Some" may refer to handbook writers who discussed argument from probability.
  64. *Prior Analytics* 2.27.
  65. There is an "unmeditated inference," or unspoken recognition of the universal proposition. See Hauser 1985, 171–79.
  66. It could be argued that seeking a bodyguard is a "sign" of intent to establish a tyranny, and certainly paradigms and signs have some similarity; but Aristotle seems to think of




a paradigm as useful in indicating motivation or the probable course of events that the audience might not otherwise anticipate, whereas a sign is usually an existing fact or condition that anyone might recognize. More important to him, however, is the logical difference that the paradigm moves from the particular premises to a particular conclusion, with the universal link not necessarily expressed (just as the universal major premise of an enthymeme need not be expressed), whereas the sign moves either from universal to particular or particular to universal.


67. It is characteristic of Aristotle to feel that there were other subjects not yet systematically studied.
68. This passage is regarded as textually corrupt by the editors. Kassel indicates that something has been lost after *listeners*; Ross rejects *the more*. The basic thought is that people do not realize that rhetoric and dialectic, though they have a method, lack content or facts and must borrow these from other disciplines, such as politics or ethics. Enthymemes are rhetorical strategies but also usually substantive arguments; and the more the argument comes from the premises of politics, ethics, or other subjects, the more the enthymeme becomes an argument of that discipline and the less it is purely rhetorical. In practice, the limits are never reached; any argument has some strategy (what Aristotle will call “topics” in 2.23) and some content (what he will call *idia* and discuss in 1.4–14 and 2.1–17). Some possible implications of this passage are discussed by Garver 1988, but he twists the meaning of some of Aristotle’s words (*metabainō*, *tynkhanō*, etc.) to create problems that perhaps do not exist.
69. To be discussed in 2.23.4 (the chapter on topics).
70. The *topos* does not tell one anything about these subjects but can be applied to each; for example, “If it is just to punish offenses, it is more just to punish great offenses,” “If a small force will move a body, a larger force will move it as well” and “If public revenues will support a large army, they will support a smaller army.”
71. *Idia* (n. pl. of the adj. from *eidos*), “specificities, specific or particular things.” The word is chosen to denote things characteristic of the species. Aristotle here does not call these specifics topics, but he does so refer to them in 1.15.19; and in sec. 22, as well as in 1.6.1, he speaks of them as *stoikheia*, which he says later (2.22.13, 2.26.1) are the “same” as topics. Thus, many rhetoricians have found it convenient to speak of “special, specific, particular, material” topics belonging to the separate disciplines, in contrast to “common” or “formal” topics, which are rhetorical or dialectical strategies of argument.
72. For the concept of “first principles” see note on 1.7.12. Part or all of a discourse may be thought of as falling in a spectrum, varying from the most general and popular to the most technical. A speech in a law court, for example, will become less “rhetorical” and more “jurisprudential” as it undertakes detailed discussion of the law. In terms of valid proof it is desirable to do this, but too technical a speech will not be comprehensible to the judges.
73. This is because of the need for “content”: rhetoric constantly employs the special knowledge of other arts, such as politics or ethics.
74. Elements (*stoikheia*) are the same as topics; see 2.22.13, 2.26.1.





75. Aristotle's use of *genos*, *eidos*, and *idia* in this passage may make it somewhat difficult to follow; but he is probably not seeking to make a logical statement about the relationship of genus and species. In a general way he can be said to view knowledge as a genus of which particular forms, (e.g., physics, politics, and ethics) are species (*eidē*). The premises of the *eidē* are their *idia*. In the concluding sentence he also calls the kinds of rhetoric *genē* (genera), but in the first sentence of the next chapter will call them *eidē* (species) and in 3.3 reverts to *genē*. See n. 78.
76. Eighteenth-century rhetoricians add *the occasion* to Aristotle's three factors in the speech situation, and modern authorities have suggested other approaches, e.g., "addresser, message, addressee, context, common code, and contact" (Roman Jakobson).
77. This sentence is rejected by Kassel as an insertion into the text by a later reader, perhaps rightly. The audience in epideictic is not called upon to take a specific action, in the way that an assemblyman or juryman is called upon to vote; but epideictic may be viewed as an oratorical contest, either with other speakers or previous speakers (cf., e.g., Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 1), and in 2.18.1 Aristotle notes that the spectator also is in this sense a judge. The definition of epideictic has remained a problem in rhetorical theory, since it becomes the category for all forms of discourse that are not specifically deliberative or judicial; later ancient rhetoricians regarded it as including poetry and prose literature, and since Renaissance times it has sometimes included other arts like painting, sculpture, and music as well. Aristotle, however, thinks of epideictic only as a species of oratory as he knew its forms in Greece, including funeral orations like that by Pericles in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* (2.35–46) and the *Encomia* of Helen by Gorgias and Isocrates. In such speeches, praise corrects, modifies, or strengthens an audience's belief about civic virtue or the reputation of an individual.
78. The appearance here of "rhetorics" in the plural is very unusual in Greek and probably results from the use of *genē* in the plural. Aristotle may use *genē* here of the kinds of rhetorics earlier called *eidē* because in the next sentence he is going to divide them further into species.
79. In practice, as in funeral orations, speakers usually praise past actions but with the intent of celebrating timeless virtues and inculcating them as models for the future.
80. *Telos*, the final objective of the speaker and his art, which is actualized in the persuasion of an audience. Later rhetoricians sometimes call these "final headings." Each *telos* often becomes a specific topic in a speech; see, for example, the discussions of expedience and justice in the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus in the Mytilenian debate in Thucydides 3.37–48.
81. *Sympheron* is often translated "expedient"; literally, it means whatever "brings with it" advantage (Lat. *utilitas*). Later rhetoricians were troubled by the moral implication and sought to modify what they saw as Aristotle's focus on expediency in political discourse; see esp. Quintilian 3.8.1–3. Since Aristotle has said in 1.1.12 that we must not persuade what is bad, he would presumably recommend that a speaker seek to identify the enlightened, long-term advantage to the audience. "Advantageous" or "beneficial" seems the best translation. In sec. 6 Aristotle recognizes that in practice deliberative speakers are often indifferent to the question of the injustice to others of some action.





82. The advantageous, the just, the honorable, and their opposites.
83. The propositions inherent in the underlying syllogism are not necessarily all expressed in the related enthymeme; some may be assumed.
84. The subjects of propositions common to all species of rhetoric are thus the possible and impossible, past fact (or its nonexistence), future fact (or its nonexistence), and degree of magnitude or importance. These are discussed further in 2.19.

