Arist_Lect3_Friendship

Organization:

NE gives 2 Books to friendship: Books VIII and IX. Our excerpt printout contains chapters 1-11 of just Book VIII, identical with Book Θ for our excerpt. We are thus discussing only a small portion of the overall excellence of friendship.

Our Excerpt: Book VIII/ Θ, Chapters 1-11.

Chapter 1: Opinions held concerning friendship and what is good about it, not necessarily also what Aristotle thinks.

Chapter 2: Opinions on what friendship is. Intro of questions Aristotle wants to raise. Basic distinctions of values: the ‘good’, ‘the pleasant’ and ‘the useful’. What kinds of good do those who enter into friendship pursue? In each case that is determined by what matters to the parties concerned. In friendship ‘good-will’ must be reciprocal: Each must wish the good of the friends. Both need to be aware of these dispositions.

Chapter 3: Imperfect friendships, based on usefulness and pleasure.

Chapter 4: Perfect friendship between good people.

Chapter 5: Ranking of symmetrical friendships: joint pursuit of ‘good’, joint pursuit of pleasure, joint pursuit if utility. The highest friendship includes the inferior values. In isolation the lower friendships suffer from shortcomings, unless embedded in the perfect one.

Chapter 6: Further aspects of the three kinds: ‘bad’ people in friendship. Different ways to pursue ‘the good’ in friendship. The significance of togetherness and apartness. Age and character as factors.

Chapter 7: Characters of the kind of liking or love (philia) that belongs to ‘perfect’ friendship. Specification and additional features of perfect friendship: equality condition; restriction to few, familiarity. Wealth and authority as limiting backgrounds.

Chapter 8: Focus on equality of exchange. Distinction between asymmetrical and symmetrical friendships.

Chapter 9: Further specification of equality in friendship through contrast with equality under the excellence of justice. Discussion of significance of ‘being liked by …’ and ‘liking …’ a friend.

Chapter 10: Loving/liking seems to be the virtue of a friend, the role whose quality matters more than the role of being loved/liked. Typical personalities and interests that lead to the different forms of friendship.

Chapter 11: Sharing and distribution of things shared, differently treated in different forms of friendship. Just distribution distinguished from distribution of things shared in friendship-sharing.

What counts as friendship?

Varieties of friendship.

' Friendship' is presented from the point of view of an excellence. Aristotle's dominant perspective is therefore normative: in which way does friendship contribute to the excellence of the person who is a member in a friendship? Two levels of evaluation: (1) What does one need to be or do to in order to be a good/better friend, what makes one be a bad/worse friend? (2) To be involved in friendship is itself an excellence, as contrasted with not being in a relation of friendship. And: to be involved in friendship allows for better or less good ways of being friends. As for all excellences, Aristotle tries to give guidance to those who consider friendship, or are friends of someone.

Why is the presentation of friendship ambivalent? “Friendship is a virtue or something with virtue” (1155a2). The imperfect friendships do not qualify as excellences. They are only indirectly good when integrated into or leading to the type ‘perfect friendship’. It also turns out that perfect friendship is a deviant sort of virtue.

But Aristotle cannot go directly to answer normative questions abut friendship in general, because there is a bewildering variety of friendships. In everyday life we call ‘friend' the other in very many different kinds of relations, and the normative implications of different kinds will be different. Aristotle's Greek environment calls 'a friend' people in relations, which for us today do not qualify for friendship, and the inverse: we call ‘friend' people in relations Aristotle would not accept as relations of friendship. The variety of friendships in Aristotle's understanding: foremost of course the symmetrical friendship between good people who singly and jointly pursue excellence. But friendship also occurs in many other types of relation: lovers, husbands and wives, parents and children, siblings, ruler and subject, kinsmen and kinsmen, citizen and fellow-citizen, fellow-travelers, soldiers who are comrades in war, the host and his guest, the learned and the ignorant, the businessman and his business partner or client, a group of ' friends' (think of the TV series of that name) and many more may count as friends if additional conditions obtain. Aristotle divides friendships into symmetrical and asymmetrical ones, and the symmetrical friendships into three ranked types according to the predominant motive for becoming and remaining friends: pursuit of excellence, pursuit of pleasure, pursuit of utility.

The concept of friendship:

The types Aristotle admits as being bonds of friendship share one common element that binds people with the bond of friendship. It is 'love' or 'liking' (I will use these two terms interchangeably, translating the Greek term "philia”. Distinct from “eros”). It would be applicable to, all varieties of friendship, perfect or imperfect, symmetrical or asymmetrical. Now love is again many things, depending whether I love a sunset, my dog, my boyfriend or girlfriend, or my 'buddies'. What distinguishes these different loves or likings from each other is the fact that the comportments that express my love in each case will be very different from sunset to dog to girl-friend or to buddy.

The Love of friendship: What then is it to love another with the specific love of friendship?

Aristotle has a special term for the love friends have for each other, and need to have for each other in order to be friends:' goodwill' (1155b34). One has goodwill towards another when one wishes the good of the other, and, if and when action is called for, acts for the good of the other. In its general understanding, that ’good of the other’ expected to be willed by me as a friend is not just the excellence in the ethical sense. All kinds of goods at the side of the other may be the essential feature that qualifies our relation of friendship. As a friend my goodwill may be turned towards the other’s pleasure, his/her welfare/utility, or what I owe to the friend as a consequence of his status. The good of a person, in turn is, what has worth for that person. If Alcibiades desires intimacy, then this is a good for him, and would be, in Socrates’ perspective, something that might enter the scope of his goodwill. There are, of course, good reasons at Socrates’ side not to favor that specific good of Alcibiades. We see that goodwill towards the friend is necessary, but that friends will not simply accept as object of their goodwill what the other desires. Only those can factually be friends who wish for the/a good of a friend or, in other words, are well disposed towards the other. The positive disposition or goodwill will also need to be manifest in behavior. The choice of object will be qualified by further criteria.

Ego and Alter:

Let me introduce terms that will facilitate my discourse. In friendship there are obviously at least two people, say A & B. But there are also roles each of them plays. I will use ‘Ego’ is to be the one whose feelings or actions, whose overall attitude towards the other is being considered. ‘Alter’ will be that other, the one befriended by Ego. Alter is the object of Ego’s feelings, actions, and attitudes. If A and B are friends, then each is Ego inasmuch as he is the one who feels or acts as a friend towards Alter. But each, A as much as B, is also Alter for the matching attitudes, in which the other has the role of Ego.

{Ego --à Alter}

{A’s goodwill towards B}

A …………. is friends with ………. B

{B’s goodwill towards A}

{Alter ß-- Ego}

“In speaking of a friend, . . .we should wish the things that are good for his own sake.” (1155b31) In other words the good we wish and perhaps work at providing should be the good of Alter, not, or not primarily, the good of Ego. (This is not yet saying that Alter is also the one who decides on what’s good for him/her. I can easily be in charge of the good of Alter, for example as a parent.) Note the normative term: “should wish …”

For Alter’s sake: Who and what determines what has worth for Alter who is the object of goodwill? The first thing to note that what counts as worth or worthy needs to be determined for Alter, the recipient of friendly love. (1155b24). The alternative would be that what is to be considered in goodwill is determined for Ego. Distinction: (a) Alter as the one whose good is at stake. (b) Alter as the one who has the say over his good. (a) prescribes that ultimately, it is up to the position of Alter, the one who is in the befriended one, the one who is the object of friendship, to serve as basis for the determination of what counts as good. But, (b) the second part of the distinction: Ego can be the master behind the wish for Alter’s good(s). Is Socrates one-sidedly doing this for Alcibiades? In that case worth is determined by what the other feels is worthwhile for his friend, what should be the friend’s worth. Aristotle only raises the problem, without deciding who will be the judge, Ego, Alter, or an apersonal good (1155b22-28). He has good reasons because both may be bound by cultural and social norms that remove the privilege of Ego and of Alter. Sometimes a subjectively selected ‘good’ is really not ‘good’, either by being a disadvantage, or by being unethical.

Wish and Action:

A qualification already mentioned needs to be underlined. It may look as if wishing good for the other were sufficient at this place. But Aristotle makes clear that quite a number of places that there also needs to be manifestation of this wish in action and interaction between the friends. Goodwill includes action intended to realize the good of the other. Does this exclude that that action also serves the good of Ego? We will see in a moment that this is not the case; for one and the same attitude, and one and the same action can very well manifest goodwill of Ego towards Alter, and serve the interests or promote the good of Ego.

Three conditions:

In 1155b33 Aristotle "in speaking of a friend, we say that we should wish the things that are good for his own sake." Call this the 'normative criterion of friendship-love’. ‘Does my wish or action For Alter’s exclude that my goodwill is (also) for my own, Ego’s own, sake? It would if my own sake or the sake of Alter sre dominant intentions. I will return to the question of ‘for-the-sakeness’, because it marks the divide between perfect friendship and the two imperfect types.

As the relation of friendship is symmetrical with respect to goodwill - friends must love/like each other - reciprocity of goodwill is a necessary condition for friendship. As a consequence only those are friends who mutually feel and manifest in the behavior goodwill towards each other. Friends must love/like each other with the love of friendship. Call this the 'reciprocity condition of friendship-love'. (1155b34). If only one of the two has goodwill, but not also the other, then instead of friendship we have ‘looks friendlily upon’.

In the third-place, you are not really the friend of the other unless he is aware of your love for him in the modality of goodwill. Mutual knowledge is the third condition of factual friendship. You can hate and admire, wish good or bad to someone from a distance. As long as the other does know nothing about this, you are not friends. Call this the condition of ' shared knowledge'. Both reciprocity and sharedness concern goodwill.

First summary: The most general common feature of all friendships:

What has been said so far combines to a threefold hierarchy of necessary conditions for friendship: in order to be friends people must

(1) feel goodwill towards the other, wish the good for the other, and act for the good of the other;

(2) Goodwill, including action for the sake of the good of the other must be reciprocal;

(3) they must have shared knowledge of (1) and (2), i.e. of goodwill and reciprocity.

Shared knowledge: Each knows that the other knows, …

Together the criterion of love, the reciprocity condition of love, and the condition of shared knowledge constitute a set of necessary conditions. They also set friendship, apart from admiration, mere approval of the other (1157b18), positive attitude towards the other and erotic love. All of these can be one-sided, lacking reciprocity, and can exist unbeknownst to the other. Note, that we have as yet said nothing about the excellence of friendship. Nor have we said anything about what makes a friendship good, or what makes it less good. We have only said what is necessary for there to be a friendship between people.

Let us stop for a moment and return to the variety of friendships sketched above. Clearly, not all, knowledge is of the kinds mentioned there, not even the relation of brother to brother is per se a relation of friendship. There was no friendship between Cain and Abel. They ought to have been brotherly friends, but weren’t. For friendships, different as they may be in other respects, the specific love of friendship is necessary. We will see that it is not a sufficient condition.

The common interest that ties together people in a business relation, or the pleasure a group of young adults has in spending time together, are they a form of love? To what extent dothey display goodwill towards the other? What is the good that all the participants wish and confer to the other? In a business-relation self-interest is the driving motivation. But before we disqualify business relations from friendship we need to be careful. The fact that each of the two business-Egos looks for his own advantage does not exclude that that Ego also wishes that Alter profit from the transactions between them. This should be sufficient for ' wishing good'. But not also for the condition of ‘for-the-sakeness’, as we will see. The same holds for those who are friends because they find pleasure in their company. Of course, if Ego just pursues his own pleasure, completely disregarding the pleasure of Alter, then that Ego doees not have goodwill for Alter. But sincerely wanting to entertain the other in having fun oneself could constitute friendship in the pleasure sense, provided it is reciprocal.

What kind of love is goodwill?

Contrast between friendship-love and erotic love:

It is unlike that between the erotic lover (erastes) and the erotically beloved (eromenos) (1157a6). For Aristotle erotic love is not directed at the pleasure of Alter, but at that of Ego: “The lover is pleased by beholding the beloved, i.e. gazing at, the beloved, whereas the beloved is pleased by receiving attention.” (1157a8). You may wonder: Isn’t there more in erotic love than ‘beholding’? Even if physical beauty is a necessary basis for erotic attraction (not Plato’s view, otherwise Socrates would not be erotically attractive!), we all know that looks are not all there is in desire. Aristotle’s main point is elsewhere, but not clearly expressed. Erotic love is dominated by the interest of Ego. It is not goodwill towards the other, but predominantly the search of pleasure for Ego. The same holds of the beloved: what Aristotle calls ‘attention’ is the pleasure of being loved. What about requited love, where each is in the position of Ego and of Alter, each one in the relation of erotically loving and erotically beloved? Again: Let the condition of love be shared knowledge as it is between Socrates and Alcibiades. Does that constellation also fulfill the necessary condition of friendship, which is: goodwill towards the other? It does not! In Aristotle’s understanding of erotic love each lover-Ego and beloved-Alter seeks his/her own pleasure, but not that of the other. Erotic love is, for Aristotle, a concept governed by self-centeredness: pleasure sought and received for one’s own sake. Friendship, on the other hand, is ‘other-centered’. In the relation the friend must pursue a good for the other. Does that exclude that a lover be motivated also or even predominantly by a good – here: the pleasure – of the other? No. However, this motivation is not a conceptual element of erotic love. Where it is present, it is an element of friendship integrated into erotic love. Can friends also be erotically involved? Of course! But under the label of ‘lovers’ they will be engaged in an asymmetrical, self-centered relation. The friends need to be aware of that, and of the tension that introduces into their friendship. (To hesitate to engage in erotic relation in order not to lose the beauty of friendship).

Friendship-love/-liking described:

Aristotle offers us a partial description of friendship-love in Chapter 7 of our excerpt. His focus is ‘perfect friendship, where both pursue excellence (the good), are friends predominantly for the reason that they both pursue excellence. It is, therefore the specific pleasure of pursuing excellence they are also seeking (NE Reader 1099a6-21), the satisfaction drawn action for the sake of excellence. When we encounter a ‘good man’ he is likable and worthy to be chosen as a friend both because we appreciate his ethical quality, and because it gives us pleasure to be with him. “Now friendship-love/liking (philesis) resembles a feeling, while friendship (philia) resembles a disposition. For liking is directed no less towards inanimate things; but to like in return [as in friendship] requires intention, and intention proceeds from a disposition. Again, good men wish what is good for those whom they like for the latter’s sake, not by feeling, but by disposition. And in liking a friend they like what is good for themselves; for a good man, in becoming a friend, becomes a good thing for his friend.” (1157b29-34). Aristotles here distinguishes liking/love that arises from sensuous attraction from the liking/love of friendship. The first is passive – a ‘pathe’ - something that happens to us. Erotic love belongs into this emotional stance. But friendship of the perfect kind arises from the attraction Alter has for us because he is good, an attraction that belongs to the pursuit of Ego himself. Here Ego is sensitive to the ethical quality of Alter because he also pursues the good. To enter into and remain in such a friendship requires an active stance. In perfect friendship there needs to be a stable attitude – a disposition – towards the good. Friendship-liking/love has therefore a strongly rational foundation. It is love for the other because he pursues excellence, with the goodwill at Ego’s side to contribute to the success of that pursuit, but also the certainty that it is good for Ego himself to be engaged in a friendship with Alter. Even in the strongly asymmetrical relation between Alcibiades and Socrates we find the attraction Socrates has for Alcibiades because Socrates is a ‘good man!’ And I would assume that Socrates the lover of the beauty of sols is also attracted to Alcibiades by the fact and hope of contributing to Alcibiades excellence through the friendship. Does this rational element exclude the warmth of affection between those who like/love each other with the love of friendship? No! Affection will either underlie, or grow with familiarity and the pleasure of spending time together. When Aristotle argues that one can’t have many friends in a relation of perfect friendship, he does not only think of the fact that good people are rare, but also that the kind of intense relation he has in mind includes a strong personal bond like the one between siblings.

Additional features of friendship:

This list of criteria that define the concept of friendship will need to include facts that characterize most friendships, even if they do not apply to all cases of friendship. Many of them follow directly from the criterion of liking or love. The most important is that friends need to be in close contact, or at least need to desire to be in close contact, and need to enjoy the company. Being together is important for friends. He also mentions familiarity and lastingness as further features and positive qualities. Sharing everything looks like the highest demand, also a demand difficult to fulfill. (Compare 1159b3).

The Three Types of Symmetrical Friendship:

Aristotle focuses on three types of friendship, all presented as symmetrical in the sense that the dominant motive is the same on each side: perfect friendship between good people; the imperfect friendship based on pleasure, and the im perfect friendship based on utility. The three reasons or motivations are values we pursue through action: we value the good for its own sake, we value what gives us pleasure; we value what brings us an increase in means, because it enables or enhances our capacity to pursue goals. (Compare 1155b20; ‘worth’ or ‘good).

The imperfect types of friendship:

Pleasure and utility characterize the imperfect types of friendship. Aristotle mainly discusses the symmetrical cases, where the friendship is predominantly motivated by utility, or by pleasure at both sides. (1156a8). Predominantly: If the predominant reason is absent or disappears the friendship will not come about or will end. Other motives may also play, but they are not strong enough to initiate and maintain the relation between the friends. Both motivations are of course possible in asymmetrical relations like between Socrates and Alcibiades.

In one case the exchange of pleasure is the predominant motivation, in the other it is the exchange of goods that are useful to the recipient. Motivations can be mixed. There can be exchange of pleasures against useful goods, but also of good for pleasure, as seems to be the case of Alcibiades’ offer to Socrates and Alcibiades. (We also find an element of ‘good’ for ‘good’ in their relation. Real relations rarely represent pure cases according to type!)

Why are utility-based and pleasure-based friendships inferior from an ethical point of view? Aristotle points to several features, among them the fact that they tend to be short-lived, appeal to youngsters, etc. We also need to note that the things one desires in pursuit of pleasure or utility are not necessarily pursued under the constraints of excellence (NE Reader Book I Chapter 51095b13-1096a10). These are, then, friendships, which are not per se virtuous. They allow “even bad men to be friends to each other.” (1157a17; slightly changed quote). Perfect friendship, on the other hand, is defined by the joint pursuit of excellence. This is an argument for ethical inferiority of the good ‘pleasure’ and the good ‘utility’ based on general ethical considerations.

But the decisive reason is specific to the virtue of friendship. Pleasure and utility-based friendships are inferior forms of friendship because they fall short on what was the normative criterion of friendship, constitutive of friendship as an excellence. “He who likes another for the sake of usefulness or pleasure does so, respectively, for the sake of what is good or pleasurable for himself, and so he likes another not for what the latter is but insofar as the latter is useful or can give pleasure to him.” (1156a14-18). Here, it is not ‘for the sake’ of Alter that Ego has goodwill, at least not in the sense required for friendship. Aristotle is saying that the ground for Ego to engage in these relations is always predominantly self-interest. If I cannot expect pleasure from Alter, I will not start a friendship with him that is of the type based on pleasure. Likewise for utility. I would not have goodwill towards Alter, nor would I act in his favor, were I not drawing advantage in pleasure or utility from the relation.

First: Is this correct? Can’t one just want to give pleasure to the other without wanting any pleasure in return - or: predominantly want to give pleasure to Alter, and only secondarily desire pleasure for oneself? Now it seems to me that Aristotle thinks that whenever one likes something one draws pleasure from that liking itself. In the case of pleasure: If I like offering pleasure to Alter, then I get pleasure out of that offering. Whenever I like contributing to the welfare of Alter by providing something useful to Alter, then one of the three motives will be in place: either I do what I do for the sake of my own pleasure, or for the sake of receiving something useful in return, or because I think doing what I do enhances my own excellence. If for my own excellence, then this is goodwill of the ethical kind and moves to the ethical type of friendship, at least in this respect. But otherwise, it is done for the sake of my own pleasure or utility. Upshot: If utility or pleasure is the predominant motive, then my action is self-centered. I am engaging in that friendship for egoistic reasons. That’s what Aristotle is saying in the quoted passage.

Haven’t we lost goodwill of Ego to Alter on our way? I said above that such goodwill, directed towards Alter is a necessary condition of friendship in general. That includes the two imperfect types characterized by pleasure and utility as bases for friendship. But we have just concluded that whenever one of those two types occurs Ego is driven by, as it were, ‘goodwill towards himself.’ Where is the altruism of friendship, in these constellations? It turns out that it is present and qualifies the two types as friendship, albeit in a distorted way. I select the utility type, and consider the condition of reciprocity. Each of the two parties is ego-centered in the way described, seeking his own utility or pleasure. But each knows that the other does the same. So, each knows that he needs to satisfy the self-centered interest of the other in order to be able to receive what satisfies his own self-centered interest. It is out of self-interest that each party has goodwill towards Alter -. i.e.: delivers to the other what is useful to the other. Similarly for pleasure: If I do not please Alter, Alter has no reason to please me. Not only is goodwill and action that satisfies Alter compatible with self-interest. Action that satisfies Alter is the very condition of my attaining what I primarily want, namely an increase in my own welfare or pleasure. Goodwill, a positive disposition towards Alter is in place. But that disposition is conditional upon ego-interests. Sure, Alter is here “not liked for what he is but insofar as he gives some good or pleasure.” (1156a19). But that is precisely the ethical inferiority in comparison with perfect friendship. Here, each likes the other for the sake of the other’s excellence, and, ultimately, himself, i.e. his own excellence as well. The hierarchy of likings we have just noticed does not obtain. The two interests are mutually supportive. This is the decisive argument establishing the ethical inferiority of utility- and pleasure-based friendships in comparison with the friendship based on excellence of both parties.

Equality in Symmetrical Friendships:

“Now the friendships that have been discussed depend on equality of exchange. For friends receive the same things from each other and wish the same things for each other” (1158b1-3). With equality we are turning to a secondary evaluative point of view, particularly important in the two symmetrical imperfect friendships of utility and pleasure. (It also holds in perfect friendship: compare 1156b35). Exchanging pleasure for utility is a problem. Here, the exchange does not concern the same kind of item (1157a6). Would the exchange of beauties Alcibiades proposes to Socrates be unequal in this sense? Socrates compares his contribution to gold, and the one proposed by Alcibiades to bronze. As concerns Aristotle, he even doubts that exchange that is unequal in kind belongs into friendship. And great discrepancy in relevant value is also a problem: one friend is rich and generous, whereas the other is poor and unable to match what he receives. “In friendship the equal according to quantity is primary.” (1158b32).

Let me look at just one aspect of the problem. Suppose two partners engage in an exchange of useful things. We are confronted with the constellation where the goodwill of each towards the other is grounded in self-interest. Now if this exchange is of unequal value this fact aggravates the negative impact of self-interest, all the way to the extreme of exploitation of the one who receives less. If, on the other hand, the exchange is of equal value, then an element of fairness mitigates the ego-centered basis of the friendship. I feel this is a secondary kind of excellence, especially if both ‘business friends’ take care to meet equality conditions as best they can.

Perfect Friendship:

Finally, the constellation that makes friendship a virtue and justifies to count the imperfect cases among the excellences, albeit of inferior value, as well. "Perfect friendship exists between men who are good, and are alike with respect to excellence. For insofar as they are good, it is in similar manner that they wish each other’s good, and such men are good in themselves." (1156b8-10). To be a good man is to pursue excellences, not necessarily to succeed each time to perform in the most excellent way. To be a good person in Aristotle’s sense is not to be a moral Saint! But it is to be “good without qualification as well as beneficial to each other” 1156b14). The reason is of course that the good person is after the highest good, which is Aristotelian happiness. Because they both pursue the same thing they are equals in the relation.

A first problem and two questions: “insofar as they are good, it is in similar manner that they wish each other’s good,” (just cited). The first question: Why does it belong to a good person’s moral excellence that he must have goodwill towards others that are also good? In the sense of purely positive attitude? Certainly. But does the person of excellence also need to pursue that of other, in attitude through goodwill, in action through promotion, in order to be fully excellent? That is what the goodwill of friendship demands. Is one good only when one also works at spreading the good in this way? Why not stop at a merely approving attitude towards other good ones? Is the one who does not work at spreading excellences also at/in others therefore a less good person? Moreover: am I, trying to live a life of excellence under an obligation to befriend all others like me? I would think that additional elements of ‘liking’ or loving’ are required for friendship, even in good men, and that they are of a highly personal and affective nature. Or else friendship would need to have a special status in the group of virtues. Something that is good when pursued, and able to be pursued in better or not so good ways, but not necessary for a good life.

Friendship and justice are the main vehicles for Aristotle’s thought that the pursuit of the good is not an isolated task for each in the community, but that the excellence of each depends on the excellence of others. Social animals in our capacities for virtue! Moreover, their exchanges are also equal, for each "receives (back) from the other the same or similar goods, those which should belong to friends." (1156b35).

' Love'/Liking in Perfect Friendship:

It sometimes looks as if just to encounter alter who is a good person is a sufficient reason for friendship between Ego and Alter. If this were the case, all good people who enter into contact with each other would be friends. This would be an unwelcome result, even if as Aristotle says good people are rare. Aristotle is to hold this idea because of two theses. The first says that in perfect friendship we love the other because he is a good person. The second thesis says that in this friendship we must love the other 'for his own sake.' (1155b34) The two conditions qualify that friendship as being of the perfect kind. If they were jointly sufficient, the unwanted consequences, that we are required to befriend every god person in our proximity, provided that we ourselves are good, would follow. But this is not the case. What then is it, to love another with the love of friendship in the mode of perfect friendship? Aristotle is overly rational in his account of friendship love. A disposition of goodwill, he says (1157b30-36). Is the affection, he also mentions, the consequence of the encounter of two good people, originating from the fact that they both pursue the good? Or is it, as I think, an additional element, an affinity between just those two people, perhaps not passionate (eros), but still an independent feeling of love? “Good men wish what is good for those whom they like for the sake of the good, not by feeling, but by disposition. And in liking the friend, they like what is good for themselves.” (1157b32). The passage suggests a highly rational ground for the mutual liking.

Why befriend a good person when I am already a pursuer of the good in my own right? One will immediately think of the support for my own pursuits I might receive (Phaedrus). But what if one embodies the good as much as Socrates does, at least in the eyes of his admirers? The next though might be: Pursuing the good includes my interest in the good of the other, and as a friend, my goodwill is directed at the good of Alter. This looks better, but is still an instrumental reason: I befriend the other good person in order to help that person to be good -, better than he alone can be. It looks to me as if both reasons were not sufficient to confer to perfect friendship the character of an excellence in line with the other excellences. Excellences are things that are pursued for their own sake, just because it is good to pursue them. Both my own and my friends gain in excellence through our friendship would say: friendship is an excellence because it improves the self’s or Alter’s excellence. I think perfect friendship is a true and independent excellence for a different reason. That reason is that it is part of a good life to be in association with somebody else who is also good. That joint goodness, pursued internal to a friendship of love between two good people, is a better life from an ethical point of view than a life of single pursuit of excellence. The goodness of doing good – together!

Structurally Asymmetrical Friendships:

These are friendships internal to a social relation that distributes differently duties and rights to those in the relation. Aristotle mentions them in Excerpt Chapters 1, 8, 910 & 11. The most important discussion is in Chapter 8. Examples: father-son, husband-wife, ruler-subject. Somewhat different in the character of the asymmetry: poor-rich, ignorant-learned, lover-beloved, beautiful-ugly (1159b15-18). Host-guest is also mentioned. The first thing to note: “The virtue and function of the friend in each of these friendships is different.” (1158b19). No common feature between different relations of asymmetrical friendships as to what constitutes a ‘good’ relation of its kind. But also: “Each such friend neither receives from the other the same as he gives to the other, nor should he seek to do so.” 91158b20). Those relations are asymmetrical relative to friendship because to be a ‘good . . .’ (son, father, learned, ignorant, etc.) is different at the two sides. Exchanges are of different things, both in concrete goods/actions and in kind.

A consequence the first point of evaluation is: Is he a good father? Is he ignorant in the right kind of way – i.e. ready to shed some of that ignorance through learning? The criterion of equality of things exchanged does not apply. The three pure types all have that criterion: the same kinds of things are going from one to the other. Each participant is in the position of Ego and Alter, and in both positions a participant in the same kind of transaction: the good, the pleasurable, and the useful. And this equality is one of the criteria for what it is to be a better or worse friend. Not so in the structurally asymmetrical relations. You must do what is right by your position in the relation. You may even ridicule yourself when you demand to be loved by the other as you love yourself (115916-20).

Does the criterion of goodwill apply? These relations are not per se friendly. Inimical relations between fathers and sons have been heard of! So: more than just the relation needs to be in place. Are the partners in a structurally asymmetrical relation friends just by doing their duty? No, a friendly attitude is also required. Each of the partners must have towards the other that positive attitude that’s characterized as goodwill. Goodwill and affection (1158b27) are equally necessary according to the social norms and for friendship. But the duties arising from the asymmetrically distributed positions must be maintained as the foil and frame, and, in a way, as the limit for friendship in this constellation. Father and son cannot become friends on an equal basis.

Or are they? Aristotle says: “whenever the feeling of affection is shown according to merit, then in a certain sense there arises an equality, which is, indeed regarded as belonging to friendship (1158b29). That would be a case where each appreciates, feels affection towards the other because each does well what he is supposed to do in the relation. A good father and a good son, loving each other because they have a good relation from the point of view of what the relation should be. We have reached the specific satisfaction of doing the right thing we have encountered in the practice of excellences. But this time, that satisfaction is a mutual bond. It is also, by the same token, and in that respect, a friendship between two good people - one as son, the other as father. The equality Aristotle mentions in the quote is equality in the good. Each gives to the other a good of the same kind, and that is a piece of ‘the good.’

If, on the other hand the asymmetrical relation transforms into one of the imperfect types, or a mix of the goods of the imperfect types, then we have an ethical problem. Many of the demands in asymmetrical relations are there for the sake of Alter. This is particularly clear in the relation of children to parents. It may not look that way for parents. How are filial duties there for the sake of parents? In the old days, that was, for example care for the parents in old age, continuation of the line, the pride connected to a successful child etc. Some of these duties are exchanges of utilities. Others are exchanges of pleasures. And there are, of course, constellations where pleasure is received in exchange of utility provided. But all this takes place in the frame of the asymmetrical relation and the social conventions that regulate it. Now imagine that the asymmetrical relation changes, or is led by some of the parties as if it were asymmetrical relation for the exchange of useful goods or of pleasure. Immediately, an entirely different logic of exchange sets in. It will be the logic of barter or commerce, or the logic of pleasure from society, not necessarily devoid of goodwill towards Alter, but, as we saw earlier, grounded in self-interest of the Ego position. Where the dominant motive changes in this sense, the specific Alter-directed features of the conventional asymmetrical relation are lost.